By Ali Ezzatyar
The question of whether Israelor America will attack Iran has had ashelf life that is unheard of in international affairs, and the factors thatweigh on a yes or no answer to the question have changed surprisingly littleover the last ten years. But there isone variable that could alter everything this year: November.
Prior to, and in the early stages of the Iraq War, there was the notion in foreign policycircles that America couldlaunch a military attack on Iranitself. America had aninterventionist president driven by perceived ideals that made Iran seem likea perfect target. Such an attack would have been primarily designed to ensurethe failure of Iran'snuclear program; the larger question was whether George W. Bush would try totake it all a step further and force regime change in Tehran. These were ideas being discussed asearly as 2002; it wouldn't be farfetched to say an attack on Iran felt asimminent then as it does now.
The more "Mission Accomplished" became the biggest Americanforeign policy quagmire in generations, however, the less likely an Americanattack became. And somewhere around when the 3000th Americanmilitary serviceperson was killed in Iraq,the idea that America couldattack Iranfor any reason had vanished into seeming impossibility. Until now, the ongoinginstability in Iraq and Afghanistan, along with the 2008 election of apresident critical of recent American interventionism, continues to hamstring any notion that the United States could embark on a military venture againsta bigger, more powerful, more complicated Iranian foe.
It was about the same time, during Iraq's most tumultuous moments ofthe last decade, that talk of a unilateral Israeli strike became prevalent. Israel hasalways been considered the primary beneficiary of such an attack, and hence theidea that their highly capable military could go it alone was always feasible although not preferable to an overwhelming American strike.Until recently, however, there was the notion that Israelwould not act without America'sapproval. This was because the success-to-repercussions ratio for Israel was poor, but also because the chaos ofwar in Iraq and Afghanistan made intervention in Iran dangerous to America,Israel'smost important ally, no matter who the attacking party was.
And since George W. Bush was seen as one of the mostIsrael-friendly presidents ever, America'shamstring was necessarily Israel's.The logic was that if Israelattacked Iran without America's go-ahead and help, America couldget dragged into a third war, which could ultimately serve to tarnish U.S.-Israelirelations permanently. George W. Bush was thought to have put his neck on theline sufficiently for Israel,and we assumed then and know now that he drew a red line around Iran. A thirdwar in the Middle East for George W. Bush would have been disastrous, even moredefinitively writing off George W. Bush as one of America's worst presidents,and ensuring failure in the 2008 presidential elections for any Republicancandidate. After Obama's election, the writing was well and clearly on the wallfor Israel: we are notattacking Iran,and neither are you.
So why the history lesson? If the foregoing is mostly true, I think we can draw two importantconclusions:
First, not enough has changed elsewhere to make anAmerican attack on Iranany more likely in the short term as it was five years ago. Afghanistan is increasingly unstable while Iraq'sdirection remains a huge question mark. Furthermore, Pakistan has come to resemble moreand more an ally-turned-enemy, and any fallout from a breakdown in relationsthere could be catastrophic. There is just too much risk involved with anattack on Iran.
To the contrary, and more importantly, this is the mosttemperate climate for an Israeli attack on Iran we have seen. There are someobvious reasons, such as unprecedented Iranian isolation, Iran'sreportedly nearing critical stages in its nuclear development, and recentaccusations of assassinations of Israelis abroad. But there is something muchmore profound from an Israeli perspective.
A plurality of Israelis believe that Barack Obama is theleast Israel-friendly president in American history. They harbor suspicions about hisintentions in the region and generally believe he may abandon Israel in ways unprecedented topresidents before him.
An attack on Iranthis year is unquestionably dangerous to Obama's reelection. There is noscenario where a unilateral attack by Israel will not hurt Obama'schances. We probably do not need to discuss how a failed attack, the mostlikely scenario of a unilateral Israeli strike according to most analysts,would be disastrous for U.S. interests and the president personally. But even a successfulIsraeli attack would wreak havoc on financial markets, on American interests inthe region, and portray Obama as a man with no control over a key regionfor U.S. interests. This is the most likely scenario for an unlikely Republicanwin in November 2012.
Even if the American public is critical of an Israelistrike, the hawkish Republican candidate-turned-president, who has beendistinguishing himself all year long on the principle of being forceful with Iran, comes to power with Israel'sinterests in mind. It is win-win for Israel.
If Israel waits long enough to ensure there is no sanctionfrom an Obama administration for its attacking Iran, but not until after theelections themselves, it can both perform an operation it has been planning foryears, and one which it sees as vital to its long-term survival, whilesupplanting the president of its largest benefactor that it wants to see goneanyway. Could Israelbe planning an October, or perhaps August / September surprise? It wouldn't bethe first time Iran has beenused to win a U.S.election. (Remember this one?)
